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Can Government

By James A. Martin, Professor of La~

The following is an adaptation of a speech delivered by
Prof. Martin at the Sixth Life Sciences Symposium at the
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories in New Mexico. The
proceedings, including Prof. Martin's speech, will be
published in the American Industrial Hygiene Journal
under the general title, "The Impact of Energy Production
on Health: II. The Development and Communication of
Health Information."

Energy needs to make decisions on how much money to put
into fusion research , it is somewhat counterproductive to
wait until one is absolutely certain that fusion research will
he successful. If the question is whether or not to ban a
certain food additive on the grounds that it may cause
cancer, delay may both increase the number of possible
cancer cases and increase the economic dislocation in
businesses which manufacture or use the additive.

The Problem
Of the many people who make important political or
social decisions in this country, very few are scientifically
trained. Yet it is obvious that many of the most important
decisions facing us depend very heavily on the answers to
questions that are outside common experience and in the
realm of science or technology. A list of a few of the more
obvious problems in the news confirms the pervasiveness
of underlying scientific issues: nuclear waste disposal,
cancer-inducing chemicals, sources of energy, control of
harmful chemicals in the environment, etc.
We do, of course, have methods for answering the
scientific questions that underly these problems. Policy
makers have science advisors. Administrative agencies
hold hearings in which the testimony of experts is received.
Fact-finding committees are formed. Advisory panels
composed of lay people and scientists are asked to
investigate problems, make findings, and suggest solutions
or possible courses of action. Courts listen to the testimony
of expert witnesses. Pressure groups appeal to the decision
makers or to the public in the hopes that the public will
apply pressure to the decision makers. Each of these is a
method of answering scientific questions, though, of course,
they vary considerably in their reliability and desirability.
To the naive, the problem of finding the best approach
might seem an irritatingly simple one to solve. After all, the
scientific method is widely known and understood by
experts. Why can't a bit of common sense, good faith, and
the scientific method take care of the problem?
The answer lies in the basic differences between the
product of the scientific method and the needs of policy
makers. The scientific method produces hypotheses,
attempts to test them, and treats as provisionally verified
those that cannot be refuted . But no scientific theory,
however hoary its credentials, is ever finally verified.
Probably the best-known example of the dangers of
overconfidence in science is Newtonian physics, whose
reign was long enough to have raised it to the status of
scientific dogma. Kant is said to have believed that the
principles of Newtonian physics could be derived from
pure reason. Twentieth-century observations suggested by
Einstein, however, showed that Newtonian physics is
merely a close approximation of the way the universe runs.
In contrast to scientists who can wait forever for a correct
answer, politicians and policy makers need to make
decisions within limited periods of time. Often it is literally
more important that a decision be made than that it be
correct. Even in less drastic cases, the extra certainty that
might he derived from waiting longer is not worth the cost
of delaying the decision. If Congress or the Department of

Some Proposals
Clearly, the scientific method and the needs of the policy
makers are at odds. Clearly, something other than the
scientific method per se is necessary to give provisional
answers to the policy makers. One of the more publicized
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methods for answering the scientific questions underlying
policy decisions in the past several years has been the
"science court" proposal of Dr. Arthur Kantrowitz of AvcoEveritt Laboratories.
Kantrowitz, and a presidential advisory commission he
headed. proposed a quasi-legal procedure of some detail.
The essence of their suggestion lies in the following points:
[a] A science court should decide only scientific questions
and not make value judgments. (b) It should employ both
advocates and judges. Advocates should he selected from
the parties actually involved in the underlying dispute, and

judges should be chosen for their learning in the area and
for their impartiality. (c] The basic procedure would
require each side to make proposed findings limited to
assertions of fact.
Findings as to which there was agreement would be taken
as accepted. Hearings would be held concerning those that
remained . Hearings would allow cross-examination, either
oral or written, under some informal procedure. After
considering the evidence, the science court would pass on
the disputed proposed findings, making findings of its own,
the sum of which should lead to a decision on the
underlying scientific question, e.g., does saccharin cause
cancer in human beings, and if so, to what degree and under
what circumstances? The science court would not, under
the proposal. try to suggest what should be done with the
answers to the questions proposed-it would not, for
example, recommend that saccharin be banned, sold freely,
or whatever. These questions would be answered by the
policy makers, enlightened by the findings of the science
court.
I have, of course, glossed over many problems, such as
how to select adequate judges. Each of these questions has
been given careful thought and each has, in my opinion, an
answer that is plausible enough to make a test of the science
court worth trying.
Although the "court" in "science court" may be
somewhat inappropriate, it is an indication that Dr.
Kantrowitz looked to the legal model for fact-finding. Why
should the legal model. famous through popular television
programs for its histrionics and its susceptibility to
manipulation and error, be a model for providing answers
to scientific questions?
The main reasons, I believe, are two: First, the more
glaring weaknesses to the legal, fact-finding method are not
inherent serious weaknesses; they can be minimized. That
they are not minimized in the legal system itself is
attributable to a host of social. political. and historical
factors which a new institution, intelligently planned, might
he able to avoid. Second, the chief virtue of the legal
approach is that it is responsive to the need for producing
answers that are "final" for the particular dispute in
question- "final" and reasonably reliable. In particular,
the legal system has one technique that seems peculiarly
suited for ferreting out the truth, where possible: the device
of cross-examination-the opportunity for opponents to
question each other about their positions. One of the chief
frustrations of modern discourse is to read two learned
discussions of an issue which reach opposing results and
which never seem to answer each others' arguments.
To be sure, the science court is not the only proposal that
has been made in connection with the problem of finding
accurate scientific information on which to base policy
decisions. The advisory panel approach mentioned earlier,
was employed to make suggestions both in Cambridge and
Ann Arbor with respect to municipal policy toward
recombinant DNA research . An intriguing experiment
called the National Coal Policy Project brought people from
the coal industry and various environmentalists to seek
solutions to environmental problems of coal usage.
Participants were required to agree to abide by a kind of
golden rule which forbade, for example, withholding
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pertinent information or lightly impuning the motives of
others. The approach is elaborated as "the rule of reason"
of Professor Milton Wessel at New York Universitv School
of Law. The sponsors reported pleasure with the o"utcome of
the meeting, though it should be noted the approach
depends rather heavily on the good will of the participants.
Yet another proposal that has been made recently is the
"conflict-clarifying conference" proposed by Washington
attorney Don Scroggin, which calls for the various
representatives of conflicting views to submit position
papers which summarize the data and rationales leading to
their conclusions. At a conference a referee would preside
over the production of a final paper. The paper would
include agreed-upon statements and reference to areas of
disagreement , each party addressing the areas of
disagreement in the same language and explaining the
reasons for an inability to reach consensus. As Scroggin has
noted, it is very similar to the early stages of the science
court procedure, but stops short of an official determination
on the grounds that general agreement is the only
acceptable definition of "scientific fact" and that
conclusions beyond scientific fact are necessarily value
laden.
Goals to be Achieved
Undoubtedly, I have glossed over numerous other
-proposals of various types . In the face of so many proposals
it becomes advisable to ask whether or not the goals of any
such effort can be articulated. I believe that they can (and
for the basic expression of some of these goals I am
indebted to Scroggin) .
The first goal must be accuracy, so far as possible. Just as
important, we must recognize limitations on our abilities to
achieve accuracy-an essential corollary of the goal of
accuracy is the quantification of ignorance. Any process
chosen must not only make educated guesses, but must also
attempt to tell us how probable or reliable those guesses
are . A second goal is that factual decisions be separated
from policy decisions. Scientists are not particularly well
equipped to tell us whether cigarette smoking creates an
unacceptable risk of cancer, though they may be well
qualified to tell us whether it creates a risk of cancer, and if
so, how great that risk is. Scientists are no more (or no less,
for that matter) qualified to assess the acceptability of a risk
than others; thus, their value judgments should not be
artificially magnified by association with their scientific
expertise.
Though the unacceptable-risk issue may be an obvious
example of policy decisions that should not be made by our
truth-finding device, a less obvious (and thus perhaps more
"insidious") kind of policy decision is the question of how
to proceed in the face of ignorance. Take, for example, the
question of what should be done if it is concluded that there
is insufficient information on the possibility of a nuclear
accident from a fission reactor. How to proceed in the face
of this ignorance is clearly a policy question rather than a
scientific question. But what if, as often happens, such
issues occur much earlier in the fact-finding process-for
example, when mathematical models are used that must
assign certain values to variables whose true values are not
in fact known'? Such factual assumptions, no matter how
justified, imply decisions as to how to proceed in the face of
uncertainty. Any process that makes such assumptions
must, therefore, clearly identify them for the policy maker
and indicate how they affect the certainty of the answer to
the overall scientific question.
A final goal for any system that purports to answer
scientific questions for policy makers seems obvious but is
rarely referred to : the method chosen for determining
scientific facts should be economical. Vastly important
issues may justify vast efforts and expenditures to reach
22

accuracy. hut a grand court of scientific inquisition is
hardly justified to help determine whether a few thousand
dollars should be trimmed from a NASA budget.
Emphasis on Procedures
I think that this last consideration may be the tail that
ought to wag the dog. In other words. I would suggest that no
single approach is the solution to the problem of obtaining
accurate scientific information for a wide range of policy
makers. Indeed, one of the problems with the science court
proposal may he that it is so grandiose that it is appropriate
only to a very limited class of problems of great national
significance. The science court procedure, on the other
hand, might be used by existing governmental agencies,
with modifications to take into account their own peculiar
circumstances, especially reasonable economic limitations.
I understand that Dr. Kantrowitz has recently proposed
such an emphasis on procedure rather than institutions. In
light of the goals listed above, however, certain elements
should be considered central to any procedure adopted.
Some methods are simply better than others.
First, some form of cross-examination should be
preserved, though not necessarily in the formal legal sense.
Intelligent direction by some sort of referee can minimize
the opportunities for abuses such as witness badgering.
What must remain, however, is the requirement that the
opposing positions face each other and address the issues in
the same terms and in the same forum, each being required
to explain their own view of the reasons for the differences
between conflicting positions.
Second, as noted above, uncertainty should be labeled
and, where possible, quantified.
Third, proceedings must be conducted with impartiality.
Neutral judges or referees are probably the best guaranty,
and where possible openness and public scrutiny can help
encourage impartiality.
These considerations are quite general. of course. If there
is to he a move at the national level toward rational
scientific policy making, I would suggest two steps to
advance that goal. First, the appointment of a task force
somewhat like the commission headed by Dr. Kantrowitz.
This group would he charged with the function of drafting a
set of general procedural guidelines, incorporating the
general goals just mentioned! Having performed this
function, the group could be dissolved. Then, second, a
more permanent group could be constituted to assist
decision-making bodies, such as administrative agencies , in
applying the general procedural guidelines produced by the
first group to the particular problems of the agency, coming
up with a procedure tailor made for that agency. At the
same time , following the suggestion of Professor Abraham
Sofa er of the Columbia Law School. certain pervasive
substantive problems- such as determining whether
certain chemicals are cancer causing-might be addressed
by task force groups that could suggest a uniform procedure
best designed for the particular substantive issue.
By adopting fact-finding procedures, rather than urging
entirely new institutions, success is more politically
achievable. Changes are more commonly wrought by
evolution than by revolution. The approach of modifying
existing methods rather than creating new institutions also
has the virtue of preserving as yet unappreciated virtues of
current methods for fact-finding. We should be humble
about our ahilities to invent entirely new methods of
accomplishing important goals. The present means by
which we make our decisions, however defective, are
unlikely to he totally unresponsive to current needs. A kind
of Darwinian principle guarantees that totally useless
institutions won't survive.
These suggestions may lack the pizzazz of a science court,
with all its glittering images of marble columns and the like.

A friend has already "warned" me that I wouldn't get asked
for interviews about this suggestion, as I was after I wrote
about the proposed science court for the Michigan Law
Review. So be it. The people whose job it is to make
decisions are suspicious of radical change. We all areoften justifiably. Whether they are right or wrong in
resisting radical change here, the real hope for any change
lies in helping decision makers tinker with what they have,
and thereby gaining their cooperation, rather than
suggesting altogether new institutions that will diminish
their authority.

James A. Martin
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